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Abstract 
We formulate and implement a new empirical procedure to examine the validity of 
PPP in the long-run for 153 countries by using the familiar cross-country data set of 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  Unlike the existing studies that rely on mean 
reversion of real exchange rates, we explicitly examine country-specificity in the 
deviations of the nominal exchange rate from PPP.  We find, first, that out of a total 
of 153 countries, 132 countries have achieved PPP within twenty years, 1980-2000 
and 105 countries have attained PPP over ten years, 1990-2000.  Second, according 
to the results, our method can be accepted as a workable shortcut of the direct, full-
information approach of Yotopoulos (1996) that tests for long-run PPP utilizing 
micro-ICP data.  This becomes an important characteristic of this paper since 
comprehensive micro-ICP data are no longer easily available.  As a by-product, of 
the empirical validation of our shortcut approach, our empirical results are in favor 
of the Ricardo-Balassa-Samuelson effect.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Since Cassel (1921) and Keynes (1923) opened Pandora's box of real 
exchange rates, a profusion of related concepts has cropped up in the literature.  It is 
not surprising that the abundance of definitions and standards for the real exchange 
has become a frequent source of confusion and often leads to contradictory policy 
advice (Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Edwards, 1989; Yotopoulos, 1996).  More 
recently, the precise specification of the real exchange rate has become even more 
important in view of the pivotal role that exchange rate misalignment has assumed in 
explaining the uneven development performance of various countries.  It is now 
widely accepted that chronic misalignment in the real exchange rate has been a 
major source of slow growth in Africa and Latin America, while prudent 
macroeconomic, trade and exchange rate policies have fostered growth in Asia 
(World Bank, 1984; Dollar, 1992; Edwards,1988; and Ghura and Grennes,1993; 
Rodrik, 1994; Yotopoulos, 1996).  This becomes even more crucial in view of a 
battery of policy interventions that have as their primary objective to restore 
exchange rate equilibrium.   
  In designing appropriate exchange rate policies, it becomes quite important 
to gauge first the speed of exchange rate adjustment in various countries regardless 
of their exchange rate regimes (Taylor and Taylor, 2004).  Moreover, systematic 
deviations of nominal exchange rates (NER) from their purchasing power parity 
(PPP) levels may engender serious instabilities of the international macroeconomic 
system.  There exist numerous studies that investigate how well the PPP applies in 
both the short run and the long run (Taylor and Taylor, 2004; Sarno and Taylor, 
2002).  While the early literature found that exchange rates over time did not revert 
to their PPP levels (Taylor, 1988), there is an emerging consensus more recently that 
PPP holds in the long run (Taylor and Taylor, 2004).  This more recent literature, 
that focuses exclusively on mean reversion of real exchange rates, found that the 
half-life of PPP deviations appears to be approximately four years, whether using 
time-series or cross-section data sets (Taylor and Taylor, 2004; Frankel and Rose, 
1996).  However, an important drawback of these recent studies is that they   3
investigate the overall property of real exchange rate movements, totally ignoring 
countryspecificity.  Yotopoulos (1996), on the other hand, expanded the micro-PPP 
information of the “benchmark countries” of the International Comparisons Project 
(ICP, Kravis. Heston and Summers, 1992) in order to estimate the real exchange rate 
(RER) on a country-specific basis That served to test directly for the impact of 
exchange rate misalignment on development in an endogenous growth model.  
Misalignment was found to have strongly negative effects on a county’s rate of 
growth.    
  In this paper we take a different approach to explore the validity of PPP in 
the long run on a country-specific basis.  We formulate a novel empirical procedure 
to estimate the importance of country specificities in the degree of chronic 
misalignment in nominal exchange rates, thus by-passing the direct (and more 
tedious) approach of calculating country-specific RER.  The implementation of the 
new estimation employs the standard set of cross-country data of Heston, Summers, 
and Aten (2002).   
  The balance of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present 
the theoretical framework for deriving the chronic deviation of the NER from the PPP 
exchange rate.  Section 3 formulates the econometric model for testing the long-run 
PPP by using the 153-country sample, for two partially overlapping periods.  Section 4 
presents the results of the empirical implementation.  Section 5 examines the validity 
of our shortcut method of deriving country-specific RER by comparing the results of 
the micro-PPP approach of the Yotopoulos panel of countries/years with the 
matching country/year panel using the data of the macro-PPP approach.  The 
conclusions appear in Section 6.   
 
2. Chronic Misalignments of the Exchange Rate: A Conceptual Framework 
 
  The point of origin of our conceptual framework is the following index of a 
country’s relative (to the U.S., the numeraire country) price level at time t: 
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where e and P represent a country’s nominal exchange rate and overall price level, 
respectively.   Note that the relative price level in equation (1) has been quantified 
by Summers and Heston (1991), and by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  In 
order to model the nominal exchange rate misalignments, we postulate the following 
decomposition: 
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where PT is a price of tradables and the price ratio, PT(i,t)/PT(US,t), represents the 
purchasing power parity also in prices of tradables.  Note that the misalignment of 
NER from PPP has been decomposed into an aggregate time-specific component, 
u(t), a country-specific fixed component, ε(i), and another time-variant component, 
w(i,t).  The variable ε(i) represents the degree of the country-specific chronic 
misalignment of the nominal exchange rate, NER, which can be attributed to 
systematic factors, such as chronic market imperfections, transaction costs, and/or 
government intervention in the foreign exchange market in country i.  In other 
words, ε(i) is a long-term deviation of NER from PPP, representing the chronic 
deviation of NER from PPP.
1  The time-specific term, u(t), can be interpreted 
broadly as representing the time-trend of exchange rate parity fluctuations of the 
U.S. dollar.   
 Let  PN  represent the price of nontradables.  Combining  (1) and (2) with the 
definition of the price index,  Pit P it P it T
ait
N
ait (,) (,) (,)
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− 1 , where α(i,t) denotes 
the weight of tradable goods, gives a relationship between RPL(i,t) and the real 
exchange rate (RER).  The latter is defined as the internal terms of trade, or the 
relative prices of tradables to nontradables:   5
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where RER=PT/PN.  In the equation above we note that the term in brackets is 
independent of the country i.   
 
3.  The Econometric Model   
 
  The econometric model involves the estimation of chronic NER 
misalignment as measured by ε(i) in equation (2).  It is a plausible assumption that 
the weight of traded goods is represented by the OPEN index, defined as the share of 
exports and imports to GDP, OPEN=(EX+IM)/GDP.  The data for this index are 
available in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  This  positivist definition of 
tradability as the share of the value of the total trade flow to the total of value-added 
in a country, will do service in this case since we lack data for a definition of the 
actual commodities that effectively enter international trade in each country, 
conditional on a normative component that defines the minimum participation 
required in order to constitute “effective trade.”  (Yotopoulos, 1996).  The OPEN 
index is expected to have positive one-to-one correspondence with the share-weight 
of tradables.   
  The specification of the RER rests on the Ricardo principle (Ricardo, 1817; 
Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964) that causally relates the decrease in the relative 
price of tradables to the level of development.   The RER is therefore specified as a 
function of per capita income.  Formally, our assumption leads to:  
 
(4) 
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where RGDPC is real per capita GDP and β1 is a measure of chronic RER 
misalignments which vary across countries.  The other time-variant deviations from 
                                                                                                                                                      
1 Note however that country-specific effects for the numeraire country, the U.S., are not captured.     6
the equilibrium RER are represented by βu.  Equation (4) represents the Ricardo-
Balasa-Samuelson effect when β1β2<0, under an assumption that E[βu]=1.
2  Using 
equation (4) and rewriting equation (3) by taking the logarithm of both sides, gives a 
modified determination of relative price levels.  Equation (5) will be estimated by 
using cross-country data:  
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  We postulate that the error term v(i,t) in equation (5) obeys an independent 
process with mean zero.  However, considering equation (7), we allow for the 
possibility of hetereskedasticity in the error term, v, above when we estimate 
equation (5).  The estimation uses OLS with the Huber-While’s heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors.   
 
4. Empirical Implementation and Estimation Results 
 
  The estimation of equation (5) utilizes the panel data set of international 
comparisons of the Penn Word Table 6.1, summarized in Heston, Summers, and 
Aten (2002).  The panel for the period 1980-2000 consists of 153 countries.  We 
employ two sample periods, i.e., 1980-2000 and 1990-2000.  Numbers of the valid 
samples are 2839 and 1585, respectively.   The typology of the data, with a large 
                                                      
2 We cannot test this specification because of the lack of data on the real exchange rate defined as the 
internal terms of trade.  Using the explicit estimation of the real exchange rate of 123 country-year 
observations, Yotopoulos (1996) found a linear version of this RER equation.  His result can be 
interpreted as a special case of equation (4).   7
number of cross-sectional units (153 countries) and a few periods (10 or 20 years) 
fits into the framework of the panel-data analysis.  Moreover, since the model 
applies only to the 153 countries in the study (cross-sectional units) and it is not 
used for extrapolation outside the sample, the observed differences across countries 
can be treated as parametric shifts of the regression function.  It is reasonable, 
therefore, to employ the fixed effects model to estimate equation (5).  More 
precisely, we will estimate this model as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
model with time-specific effects.    
  Tables 1 and 2 summarize our estimation results for the baseline coefficient, 
lnβ1(i) and for β2, and η(i).
3  These estimated coefficients provide supportive 
evidence for the condition that β1β2<0.  Although the estimated β2’s are not 
statistically significant, the directions of the estimated coefficients are consistent 
with the Ricardo-Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
  Based on equation (5) we can test the long run PPP by testing whether the 
estimated country-fixed effects, η(i), are different from zero or not.  Individual 
estimates are also reported in Tables 1 and 2.  For the results of these tables we 
employed cross-country data covering 1980-2000 and 1990-2000, respectively, and 
for 153 countries.  Hence, the results in Table 1 relate to testing longer-term PPP 
over 20 years, while results in Table 2 cover 10 years.  Based on the findings of the 
two tables we fail to reject PPP in 21 countries for 1980-2000, while the 
corresponding number for 1990-2000 is 48.  These figures indicate that out of 153 
countries, 132 countries which comprise about 86% of all countries, have achieved 
PPP within 20 years and 105 countries have attained PPP in 10 years, 1990-2000.  
Our results are consistent with the half-life of PPP deviations of about four years, the 
emerging consensus in the literature.  
 
                                                      
3  Results of individual estimates for lnβ1(i) are not presented in the Tables but are available from the 
authors upon request.   8
5. Empirical Validation of the Shortcut Method of Deriving Country-Specific 
RER 
 
  Our empirical strategy for estimating county-specific PPP is open to 
criticism on two grounds.  First, in employing the reduced-from equation (5) it relies 
heavily on a particular functional form of the Ricardo-Balassa-Samuelson equation 
(4).  Second, it uses the only set of more recent data currently available,  the 
aggregated ICP data from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 
2002).  These data have originated through extrapolation from a small number of 
countries and years, i.e., from few “benchmark observations,” for which micro-PPP 
data are available, thus generating a potential bias of our estimation results.   
  In order to investigate the validity of our approach with respect to the data 
used we compare our results with the Yotopoulos’ (1996) results based on micro-
PPP data reported for 80 countries in total (and with annual observations (for at least 
in one of the years for each country and for most for multiple of the four years) for 
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, that the ICP survey covered (Kravis, Heston, and Summers 
1992).  With respect to the methodology of deriving the internal terms of trade, the 
relative prices of tradables to nontradables for each country, and therefore the PPP 
country-specificity, the Yotopoulos approach resorted to a full information 
technique.  It consists of using the micro-PPP data of the countries in the panel in 
order to compute the ratio of each country’s prices of tradables to nontradables, 
normalized by the international prices of the same commodities (the U.S. numeraire-
country prices) whether these are in the tradable or nontradable international set 
(Yotopoulos, 1996: Ch. 6, 108-116).   The weights of the relative prices of tradables 
to nontradables for the implementation of this procedure are derived from country-
specific world trade data and they are normalized by the country’s GDP.   More 
specifically for our test, these micro-ICP data yield estimates of the ratio of PPP for 
tradables and NER, i.e., PPPT/e.  These data allowed us to estimate the country-
specific deviation from PPP, η(i), in equation (6).  The procedure employed is to 
estimate the following logged version of equation (2):   
   9
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  For the period covering 1975-1985, we have estimated the country-specific 
deviation from PPP, η(i), by using two data sets, i.e., aggregated ICP data (Heston, 
Summers and 2002) and micro ICP data as above.  The results of testing-for long-
run PPP are summarized in Table 3.  As shown in the Table there exist matching 
panel data for making this comparison for only  22 cases.  Of these, the results 
obtained by the two different methods diverge in only 5 cases.  We consider this as 
supportive evidence for our reduced-from approach of estimating equation (5).
4   
Since there is a consistency between the two sets of estimates, the method that relies 
on macro-ICP data can be accepted as a workable short-cut of the full information 
process that relies on micro-ICP data. 
  There is another interesting finding that emerges from the comparison of the 
results in Table 3.  In the 22 matching panel-data cases the PPP is unambiguously 
rejected for both sets of data in 16 cases and accepted in only one, while in the 
balance of 5 cases the two data sets lead to contradictory results.
5     On the other 
hand, in Tables 1 and 2, we fail to reject PPP for a few only countries.  This 
interesting discrepancy may suggest that, in the recent years we have more 
supportive evidence for PPP, while PPP is rejected for earlier years.  This is 
consistent with the results of other early empirical studies which consistently found 
for the failure of PPP (Taylor and Taylor, 2004).    
 
                                                      
4 Yotopoulos and Sawada (1996) also found in different comparisons that the rank correlation 
coefficients for the cross-country NER distortions from micro- and macro-ICP data are positive and 
significant.   
5  The results are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.   10
6. Conclusions 
 
  Unlike the existing studies of mean reversion of real exchange rates, we 
explicitly take into account the country-specificity in measuring deviations from 
PPP.  First, we found that 60% and 86% of all countries have achieved PPP within 
ten years and over 20 years, respectively, and only 14% of countries experienced 
persistent deviation of NER from PPP.  Our findings are prima facie consistent with 
the emerging consensus in the literature that in the more recent past deviations from 
purchasing power parity (PPP) appear to have half-lives of approximately four 
years.  Moreover, we obtained an additional, new and important finding, that the 
property of exchange-rate deviations from PPP is basically country-specific.    
  As another novelty of our study, we developed a short-cut method for 
estimating deviations of NER from PPP, based on publicly available cross-country 
aggregate ICP data.  In fact, the difficulty of estimating NER deviations has 
accounted for the wanton use of a number of imperfect substitutes in the literature.  
Since this is a new method of dealing with exchange rate distortions, the validation 
of the results becomes important.  It is based on comparison of the short-cut 
estimates in Table 3 with the results obtained by Yotopoulos (1996) who used the 
full set of micro-ICP data to estimate exchange rate parities and to weigh the effects 
of exchange rate misalignment in view of the development experience of the sample 
countries in years 1970-1985.  Our results suggest that the economy of estimation 
has not impaired the validity of the results.  Moreover, the impact of exchange rate 
misalignment, properly defined, on economic development has been, and continues 
currently to be, deleterious.    11
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Table 1 






β2 -0.002  (0.002) 0.227   
lnβ1(i) 
(baseline) 
-0.023 (0.042) 0.594   
η(i)  
American Samoa  0.310  (0.963) 0.748  
Andorra -1.836  (0.996) 0.065   
Argentina -0.385  (0.989) 0.697   
Armenia 0.534  (0.984) 0.588   
Australia 0.086  (0.959) 0.928   
Austria -5.402  (1.800) 0.003   
Azerbaijan 1.477  (1.286) 0.251   
Bahamas 3.228  (2.996) 0.281   
Bahrain -1.042  (1.024) 0.309   
Bangladesh -1.823  (1.044) 0.081   
Barbados -0.235  (0.991) 0.813   
Belarus -2.872  (1.030) 0.005   
Belgium -1.448  (0.979) 0.139   
Belize -1.112  (0.952) 0.243   
Bolivia -0.738  (0.991) 0.456   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -0.163  (0.959) 0.865  
Brazil -0.200  (0.973) 0.837   
Brunei 0.313  (0.954) 0.743   
Bulgaria -0.042  (0.956) 0.965   
Cambodia -0.143  (0.967) 0.882   
Cameroon -1.165  (1.040) 0.263   
Canada -1.630  (1.593) 0.306   
Cape Verde  -3.300  (2.740) 0.229  
Central African Republic -1.284  (1.004) 0.201  
Chad -0.703  (0.978) 0.472   
Channel Islands  0.307  (2.021) 0.879  
Chile -0.067  (1.457) 0.963   
China -0.578  (1.064) 0.587   
Colombia -0.903  (0.990) 0.362   
Comoros -0.848  (1.208) 0.483   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1.447  (1.200) 0.228  
Congo, Republic of  0.110  (1.010) 0.914  
Costa Rica  -0.471  (1.002) 0.638  
                                                      
6 Note: Regression with the Huber-While robust standard errors.  Results of individual estimates for 
lnβ1(i) are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.  The sample size is 2839 
and R
2=0.938 
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Table 1 (continued) 








Croatia 0.267  (0.969) 0.783   
Cuba -0.209  (0.949) 0.826   
Czech Republic  -0.223  (0.956) 0.816  
Denmark 1.607  (3.202) 0.616   
Djibouti -0.495  (1.497) 0.741   
Dominica -0.491  (1.048) 0.639   
Dominican Republic  -1.029  (1.114) 0.355  
Ecuador -0.192  (1.071) 0.857   
El Salvador  -1.105  (1.107) 0.318  
Equatorial Guinea  -0.437  (1.012) 0.666  
Eritrea -0.113  (1.286) 0.930   
Estonia -2.824  (3.037) 0.353   
Ethiopia 0.045  (0.952) 0.963   
Faeroe Islands  -0.657  (2.260) 0.771  
France 0.126  (0.959) 0.895   
French Polynesia  1.328  (3.614) 0.713  
Gabon 2.041  (2.560) 0.425   
Gambia -2.335  (3.984) 0.558   
Georgia 0.028  (1.223) 0.982   
Germany -0.804  (1.067) 0.452   
Ghana -0.933  (0.957) 0.330   
Greece -0.689  (0.967) 0.476   
Greenland 0.337  (1.037) 0.745   
Grenada -0.879  (0.992) 0.376   
Guam 0.187  (0.957) 0.845   
Guinea -1.116  (0.976) 0.253   
Guyana -1.012  (0.970) 0.297   
Haiti -0.167  (0.960) 0.862   
Honduras -0.146  (0.964) 0.880   
Hong Kong  0.379  (0.932) 0.684  
Hungary -2.532  (1.054) 0.016   
Iceland -0.207  (0.998) 0.836   
India -1.234  (2.176) 0.571   
Iran -0.297  (0.998) 0.766   
Iraq -2.275  (1.167) 0.051   
Ireland -0.237  (1.091) 0.828   
Israel -0.137  (3.874) 0.972   
Italy 4.463  (5.077) 0.379     15
Table 1 (continued) 








Jamaica -1.497  (1.750) 0.392   
Japan 0.211  (0.956) 0.825   
Jordan -0.109  (0.953) 0.909   
Kazakhstan -2.260  (2.114) 0.285   
Kenya -2.626  (2.193) 0.231   
Kiribati 0.981  (1.184) 0.408   
Korea, Dem. Rep.  4.202  (5.337) 0.431  
Korea, Republic of  -1.820  (0.957) 0.057  
Kyrgyzstan -0.272  (1.023) 0.790   
Laos -0.564  (0.987) 0.568   
Lesotho -0.291  (1.305) 0.824   
Liechtenstein 0.092  (0.983) 0.925   
Luxembourg -1.611  (0.991) 0.104   
Macao -1.113  (1.010) 0.271   
Macedonia -2.811  (1.208) 0.020   
Madagascar -4.667  (5.550) 0.400   
Malawi -0.181  (0.964) 0.851   
Malaysia 0.864  (0.948) 0.362   
Maldives -1.219  (1.100) 0.268   
Malta -1.857  (0.962) 0.054   
Marshall Islands  -1.234  (1.002) 0.218  
Mauritius -0.724  (0.970) 0.456   
Mexico -0.578  (0.970) 0.551   
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  -0.876  (1.208) 0.468  
Moldova 0.775  (1.070) 0.469   
Mozambique -1.236  (1.282) 0.335   
Myanmar -0.159  (0.953) 0.867   
Namibia -0.847  (0.954) 0.374   
Nepal -3.039  (1.138) 0.008   
Netherlands -0.017  (0.953) 0.985   
New Caledonia  -0.235  (0.961) 0.807  
Nicaragua -1.150  (1.042) 0.270   
Niger -2.827  (1.031) 0.006   
Nigeria -0.965  (0.950) 0.310   
Northern Mariana Islands -2.407  (1.095) 0.028  
Norway -1.971  (4.031) 0.625   
Oman -1.590  (0.984) 0.106   
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Pakistan -0.583  (1.721) 0.735   
Panama -2.040  (1.028) 0.047   
Papua New Guinea  0.049  (0.955) 0.959  
Paraguay -1.212  (1.170) 0.300   
Peru -2.088  (1.005) 0.038   
Poland -0.798  (0.954) 0.403   
Portugal -0.691  (0.956) 0.470   
Romania -1.325  (1.027) 0.197   
Russia -0.054  (0.981) 0.956   
San Marino  -0.091  (0.974) 0.925  
Sao Tome and Principe  -5.106  (1.082) 0.000  
Saudi Arabia  -0.417  (0.978) 0.670  
Sierra Leone  -1.897  (2.459) 0.440  
Singapore 3.354  (2.597) 0.197   
Slovenia -0.572  (0.985) 0.562   
Solomon Islands  -1.457  (0.980) 0.137  
Spain -1.237  (0.964) 0.200   
St. Kitts & Nevis  -0.673  (0.956) 0.482  
St. Lucia  0.350  (0.948) 0.712  
St.Vincent & Grenadines 0.303  (1.929) 0.875  
Sudan -2.015  (1.208) 0.096   
Suriname 0.498  (0.951) 0.601   
Swaziland -0.660  (1.283) 0.607   
Sweden -1.489  (1.018) 0.144   
Switzerland -0.945  (1.125) 0.401   
Syria -1.171  (0.990) 0.237   
Taiwan -3.095  (1.698) 0.068   
Thailand 0.087  (0.961) 0.928   
Togo -3.576  (1.359) 0.009   
Tonga -0.540  (0.983) 0.583   
Trinidad &Tobago  -2.037  (1.174) 0.083  
Tunisia 1.507  (1.530) 0.324   
Turkey -0.632  (1.093) 0.563   
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USA -1.211  (1.026) 0.238   
Uganda -6.723  (0.959) 0.000   
Ukraine -49.799  (2.007) 0.000   
United Arab Emirates  0.123  (0.954) 0.897  
United Kingdom  -1.030  (1.026) 0.315  
Uzbekistan -2.751  (1.744) 0.115   
Virgin Islands (U.S.)  -2.066 (4.283) 0.630   
Yemen -1.160  (1.091) 0.288   
Yugoslavia -0.326  (1.151) 0.777   
Zambia 0.275  (0.972) 0.777   
Zimbabwe 1.236  (1.005) 0.219     18
Table 2
7 
Estimated Results for Sample 2, 1990-2000 





0.001 (0.000) 0.044   
β2 -0.009  (0.027) 0.737   
η(i)  
American Samoa  -2.102  (2.164) 0.332  
Andorra -4.198  (2.170) 0.053   
Argentina -2.007  (2.185) 0.358   
Armenia -1.774  (2.185) 0.417   
Australia -1.920  (2.213) 0.386   
Austria -13.305  (5.092) 0.009   
Azerbaijan -1.531  (2.165) 0.480   
Bahamas 0.787  (3.641) 0.829   
Bahrain -3.266  (2.141) 0.127   
Bangladesh -6.383  (2.876) 0.027   
Barbados -5.613  (2.256) 0.013   
Belarus -5.428  (2.249) 0.016   
Belgium -3.832  (2.191) 0.081   
Belize -3.347  (2.151) 0.120   
Bolivia -3.039  (2.168) 0.161   
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-2.265 (2.157) 0.294   
Brazil -4.538  (2.272) 0.046   
Brunei -2.284  (2.166) 0.292   
Bulgaria -2.001  (2.156) 0.353   
Cambodia -1.984  (2.159) 0.358   
Cameroon -1.975  (2.187) 0.367   
Canada -20.690  (4.220) 0.000   
Cape Verde  -2.692  (2.467) 0.275  
Central African 
Republic 
-3.696 (2.244) 0.100   
Chad -4.133  (2.180) 0.058   
Channel Islands  0.195  (2.699) 0.942  
Chile -3.147  (2.815) 0.264   
China -2.051  (2.155) 0.341   
Colombia -4.729  (2.210) 0.033   
Comoros -2.838  (2.389) 0.235   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -2.681  (2.276) 0.239  
Congo, Republic of  -1.668  (2.151) 0.438  
                                                      
7 Note: Regression with the Huber-While robust standard errors.  Results of individual estimates for 
lnβ1(i) are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.  The sample size is 1839 
and R
2=0.948 
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Costa Rica  -3.056  (2.212) 0.167  
Croatia -1.822  (2.167) 0.401   
Cuba -2.431  (2.150) 0.259   
Czech Republic  -2.200  (2.149) 0.306  
Denmark 1.411  (3.982) 0.723   
Djibouti -1.705  (2.904) 0.557   
Dominica -6.053  (3.314) 0.068   
Dominican Republic  -7.611  (2.418) 0.002  
Ecuador 0.720  (4.523) 0.873   
El Salvador  -9.028  (3.002) 0.003  
Equatorial Guinea  -2.697  (2.180) 0.216  
Eritrea -1.862  (2.293) 0.417   
Estonia -6.725  (4.344) 0.122   
Ethiopia -2.788  (2.173) 0.200   
Faeroe Islands  -7.372  (3.950) 0.062  
France -1.916  (2.150) 0.373   
French Polynesia  -6.597  (7.117) 0.354  
Gabon -0.309  (3.339) 0.926   
Gambia -8.768  (4.572) 0.055   
Georgia -2.362  (2.270) 0.298   
Germany -3.865  (2.147) 0.072   
Ghana -3.081  (2.157) 0.153   
Greece -3.469  (2.157) 0.108   
Greenland -2.500  (2.174) 0.250   
Grenada -2.122  (2.194) 0.334   
Guam -1.848  (2.155) 0.391   
Guinea -4.536  (2.218) 0.041   
Guyana -3.393  (2.174) 0.119   
Haiti -2.441  (2.199) 0.267   
Honduras -2.560  (2.176) 0.240   
Hong Kong  -1.865  (2.145) 0.385  
Hungary -4.726  (2.174) 0.030   
Iceland -2.174  (2.154) 0.313   
India -1.603  (3.095) 0.605   
Iran -3.450  (2.218) 0.120   
Iraq -5.078  (2.421) 0.036   
Ireland -1.464  (2.163) 0.499   
Israel -3.362  (2.617) 0.199   
Italy -1.431  (7.555) 0.850     20
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Jamaica -11.737  (3.174) 0.000   
Japan -1.941  (2.159) 0.369   
Jordan -2.069  (2.145) 0.335   
Kazakhstan -4.662  (2.244) 0.038   
Kenya -4.775  (3.083) 0.122   
Kiribati -1.167  (2.371) 0.623   
Korea, Dem. Rep.  2.309  (5.996) 0.700  
Korea, Republic of  -4.068  (2.178) 0.062  
Kyrgyzstan -1.785  (2.143) 0.405   
Laos -2.063  (2.185) 0.345   
Lesotho -2.409  (2.367) 0.309   
Liechtenstein -1.328  (2.146) 0.536   
Luxembourg -3.635  (2.166) 0.094   
Macao -2.908  (2.160) 0.178   
Macedonia -5.148  (2.315) 0.026   
Madagascar -10.471  (7.235) 0.148   
Malawi -2.425  (2.150) 0.259   
Malaysia -1.572  (2.140) 0.463   
Maldives -2.339  (2.256) 0.300   
Malta -4.068  (2.151) 0.059   
Marshall Islands  -3.087  (2.197) 0.160  
Mauritius -2.352  (2.177) 0.280   
Mexico -2.775  (2.168) 0.201   
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  -6.387  (3.779) 0.091  
Moldova -1.280  (2.099) 0.542   
Mozambique -3.158  (2.313) 0.172   
Myanmar -2.460  (2.162) 0.255   
Namibia -2.680  (2.191) 0.222   
Nepal -5.551  (2.357) 0.019   
Netherlands -2.555  (2.181) 0.242   
New Caledonia  -2.357  (2.174) 0.279  
Nicaragua -2.544  (2.409) 0.291   
Niger -2.138  (3.844) 0.578   
Nigeria -3.257  (2.145) 0.129   
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
-4.685 (2.244) 0.037   
Norway -1.141  (3.652) 0.755   
Oman -3.945  (2.186) 0.071     21
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Pakistan -0.335  (3.880) 0.931   
Panama -3.815  (2.176) 0.080   
Papua New Guinea  -1.756  (2.283) 0.442  
Paraguay -2.173  (2.215) 0.327   
Peru -4.963  (2.244) 0.027   
Poland -3.175  (2.150) 0.140   
Portugal -3.642  (2.200) 0.098   
Puerto Rico  -2.382  (2.176) 0.274  
Romania -2.508  (2.233) 0.261   
Russia -2.830  (2.165) 0.191   
San Marino  -3.074  (2.186) 0.160  
Sao Tome and Principe -7.496  (2.231) 0.001  
Saudi Arabia  -2.799  (2.178) 0.199  
Sierra Leone  -12.777  (2.696) 0.000  
Singapore 25.708  (11.501) 0.026   
Slovenia -4.186  (2.774) 0.132   
Solomon Islands  -3.981  (2.180) 0.068  
Spain -3.687  (2.144) 0.086   
St. Kitts & Nevis  -2.879  (2.156) 0.182  
St. Lucia  -1.933  (2.157) 0.370  
St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
-1.466 (2.599) 0.573   
Sudan -3.830  (2.355) 0.104   
Suriname -1.796  (2.161) 0.406   
Swaziland -35.333  (6.750) 0.000   
Sweden -4.796  (2.206) 0.030   
Switzerland -4.619  (2.222) 0.038   
Syria -2.984  (2.162) 0.168   
Taiwan -5.249  (2.559) 0.040   
Thailand -2.062  (2.158) 0.339   
Tonga -2.145  (2.189) 0.327   
Trinidad &Tobago  -3.327  (2.721) 0.222  
Tunisia 0.305  (2.533) 0.904   
Turkey -3.443  (2.210) 0.120   
Turkmenistan -12.374  (3.684) 0.001   
USA -3.507  (2.210) 0.113   
Uganda -8.820  (2.186) 0.000     22
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Ukraine -52.270  (2.858) 0.000   
United Arab Emirates  -2.658  (2.154) 0.218  
United Kingdom  -5.018  (2.219) 0.024  
Uzbekistan -3.748  (2.260) 0.098   
Virgin Islands (U.S.)  -4.336  (5.100) 0.395  
Yemen -2.046  (2.216) 0.356   
Yugoslavia -2.527  (2.224) 0.256   
Zambia -1.979  (2.449) 0.419   
Zimbabwe -1.577  (2.206) 0.475   
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Table 3 
Comparing Macro-ICP Data with Micro-ICP data: 
Is Long-Run PPP Rejected for 1975-1985? 
  Test of Long-run PPP 
Based on the Macro ICP 
(Penn World  Table) Data
 
Test of Long-run PPP Based 
on Micro ICP Data 
Compiled by Yotopoulos 
(1996) 
Australia   YES  YES 
Austria   YES  YES 
Belgium   YES  YES 
Canada   YES  YES 
Colombia   YES  YES 
Costa Rica   YES  NO 
France   YES  YES 
Germany   YES  YES 
Greece   YES  YES 
Hungary   YES  YES 
India    NO  YES 
Ireland   YES  YES 
Italy    YES  YES 
Jamaica   YES  YES 
Japan    YES  NO 
Netherlands   YES  YES 
Norway NO NO 
Portugal   YES  YES 
Spain   YES  YES 
Sweden   YES  NO 
United Kingdom   YES  YES 
Yugoslavia   NO  YES 
Note: Results of individual estimates are not presented but are available from the authors 
upon request.   
 